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Abstract
In the present study a representative sample (N = 797) of the Swedish population was surveyed,
with regard to attitudes related to energy policy issues (e.g., environmental attitudes, risk
perceptions, and attitudes towards different energy production systems) and self-reported
electricity saving behavior. These factors were considered relevant in a Swedish energy policy
context, because of the planned phase-out of nuclear power. Citizens’ attitudes have traditionally
been important factors in energy policy-making, especially nuclear policy, and one of the
conditions for a successful phase-out is increased levels of electricity savings among households
and in industry, in order to compensate for the loss in energy production. Respondents reported
positive attitudes to the environment in general and to electricity saving, while the attitudes to
nuclear power as an energy production system in Sweden were relatively negative. Perceived
risk was an important predictor of these attitudes and it was concluded that it is important to
investigate mechanisms behind this variable. The relationship between attitudes towards
electricity saving and electricity saving behavior was weak. It is discussed whether the
contribution of psychological knowledge in energy conservation campaigns could be to elaborate
on people’s willingness to be moral and public-spirited citizens in combination with their pro-
environmental attitudes. This work was supported by grants from NUTEK and FRN. Viklund
(1999) presented more data from the survey referred to here.
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Energy Policy Options
- from the Perspective of Public Attitudes and Risk Perceptions
Introduction
Policy-making in modern society is a complex art. In a representative democracy, there is
a wide range of factors, which must be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.
Policy-makers must always be aware of the economic consequences of their decisions.
Furthermore, in modern society there is very often a need for risk analysis before making
important decisions. Such an analysis includes assessment of the probabilities of the occurrence
of different events, together with an evaluation of the consequences if these events should occur,
in terms of effects on public health and the environment. Policy-makers must also reflect on
demands by various interest groups and stakeholders in society (e.g., organizations representing
industry, environmental organizations, and consumer movements). There are also a variety of
political factors to take into account, such as the distribution of mandates among political parties,
which is the key to practical possibilities of making political decisions. Naturally, the policy-
maker is guided, and should be guided, by his or her convictions, as well as the ideology and
opinions of the party he or she represents.
But, as the power of the policy-maker is dependent on the will of the voters, he or she
must also have some knowledge of their political attitudes and behaviors. Granted, the citizens
delegate much responsibility to politicians in elections, but the act of voting is not the only way
in which voters can influence policy. One obvious way is to form civic associations, some of
them with the explicit aim to influence policy. However, even citizens who are relatively inactive                                                                                                                   
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politically can influence policy by participating in polls and other kinds of surveys. Thus, there is
a fairly important participatory element in modern democracy, which is also included in most
models of ideal democracy, where people have much influence over policy. A popular influence
is not only preferable from a normative viewpoint, though, since knowledge of citizens’ opinions
also could be viewed as a very constructive decision support tool.
Knowledge of citizens’ attitudes and behaviors may be especially important in energy
policy, since it is traditionally an area where Swedish citizens have had a comparatively large
influence. Of course, people can have their say in national elections, but the nation’s energy
policy has also been considered important enough to arrange a referendum concerning the
nation’s future use of nuclear power as energy source. There have only been four other referenda
in Sweden. These referenda concerned prohibition (1922), right-hand traffic (1955), a new
pension system (1957), and membership in the European Union (1994). The referendum
concerning nuclear power was held in 1980 and it was decided that the nuclear power would be
successively replaced by other energy sources and that it should be completely phased out by
2010. Risk was a prominent issue in the discussions of nuclear power. Still today, it seems as
energy policy to quite a large extent is influenced by the citizens’ attitudes towards energy
sources and perceptions of (especially nuclear) risks. Viklund (1999) notes that there are voices
that doubt that the government is very interested in implementing the phase-out decision,
because of the current (relatively) positive opinion towards nuclear power in Sweden.
Finally, yet another possibility for citizens to influence energy policy is, of course, by
their consumption of electricity. In fact, because of the problems associated with phasing out
nuclear power, it has been proposed that it is necessary for households to change their energy
consumption (i.e., electricity saving must increase).                                                                                                                   
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Thus, it is clear that Sweden’s energy policy historically has been influenced, to some
extent, by people’s attitudes (mainly towards nuclear power) and behaviors (mainly their
electricity consumption). The need for public guidance over energy policy today is greater than
ever before, because of the many challenges policy-makers are facing.
The long-term policy decision taken by the Swedish government in 1997 is a good
starting point for describing today’s complex energy situation. The overall goal in that decision
was to accomplish a redistribution of the use of different energy sources in the production and
consumption of electricity in Sweden (Energimyndigheten, 1998). In the end of the 1990s, 46%
of the electricity consumed in Sweden was based on nuclear power (and approximately the same
amount was based on hydro power). Nuclear power as an energy source will be phased out and
replaced by other energy sources, according to the Government.
The purpose of this transformation of the energy system is to make it more economically
efficient and friendlier to the environment, but one important objective is most likely also to
decrease the risks to the public. Risks associated with nuclear power are usually considered risks
of the type “small probability – large consequences” and people tend to worry more about these
risks, compared with other types of risks (Drottz-Sjöberg et al., 1994; Drottz-Sjöberg & Sjöberg,
1990). It was the fear of a nuclear accident that was the major driving force in the arguments
against nuclear power at the time of the referendum and it was probably this fear that contributed
most to the phase-out decision. Another objective is most likely that the Government, by
following the referendum decision, hopes to avoid a debate regarding them deceiving the
Swedish public, and the possible loss of public trust that could be the result of abandoning the
phase-out plans. To achieve these goals, the Government thus has stated its determination to
replace nuclear power (Energimyndigheten, 1998). However, at the present time, it seems                                                                                                                   
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unlikely that all nuclear power plants will be closed down by 2010. In the policy decision from
1997, it was stated that the phase-out process would start with closing the two reactors of the
nuclear power plant in Barsebäck. The first closure took place in 1999, but the second reactor has
not yet been closed, since it was not guaranteed that new electricity production and decreased
electricity consumption could compensate the loss of electricity production.
Another major change on the electricity market is the deregulation of the market. The
decision to deregulate the market is related to the phase-out of nuclear power. There is a hope
that a market deregulation will make people more efficient in their electricity consumption; that
is, they will simply consume less electricity without having to decrease their standard of living
(Bernström, Eklund & Sjöberg, 1997). If the Swedish electricity market will actually be more
efficient, in terms of more cost-efficient electricity consumption, the nation will be more capable
to manage a possible shortage on electricity (which might be the consequence of a phase-out, if
no alternative sources of energy have been found at that time).
Thus far, everything is fairly simple – the deregulation has already taken place and
should, according to the logic described above, contribute to solving an important problem
(possible shortage of electricity) associated with phasing out nuclear power. However, things are
rarely that simple in the real world. It is quite unusual that one policy decision (deregulation)
leads to the predicted result with complete certainty, since there is more than one dimension at
play in the real world – and in some cases one event can even cause two contrary effects. In the
present case, this means that deregulation not necessarily leads to decreased consumption of
electricity, since deregulation also leads to increased competition and lower prices, which is
strongly related to an increase in electricity consumption (Viklund, 1999). Yet another factor is                                                                                                                   
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the long-term trend towards higher levels of consumption, which is largely due to usage of new
household appliances and electronics (Energikommissionen, 1995).
There are other complications with phasing out nuclear power. One important factor is
that of effects on the environment and another factor is cost-efficiency. The main threat to the
environment is that of carbon dioxide emissions, which have been estimated to increase in case
of a phase-out of nuclear power (Energikommissionen, 1995). In short, nuclear power is a clean,
“green”, and inexpensive energy source and it is a major technological challenge to find an
energy source with similar advantages.
The government has two options. The first option is to (continue to) postpone the nuclear
phase-out or even decide to continue using nuclear power as an energy source in Sweden, due to
the many problems associated with a phase-out. It would perhaps be possible to choose this
option, considering that people in Sweden currently are relatively positive towards nuclear power
and that fewer than ever before (but still a majority) are proponents of a phase-out. There is an
evident risk, however, that people’s trust in the government would be seriously damaged if the
government would change course completely and decide to ignore the result of a referendum,
regardless of how distant in time it is. Moreover, the main reason for skepticism towards nuclear
power to begin with – the risk; mainly the consequences of an accident, but also risks relating to
the management of nuclear waste – would not disappear.
The second option is to continue the process of phasing out nuclear power, despite
potential problems with environmental effects and the cost-efficiency of alternative energy
sources, and the risk of shortage of electricity, causing problems in well-being and higher
electricity prices. The reader may object, arguing that higher prices would be good, since they
would increase levels of electricity saving. The problem is, however, that long-term savings are                                                                                                                   
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desirable before nuclear power is phased out. The trend of the late 1990s was that prices were
decreasing, because of the increased competition caused by the deregulation of the electricity
market (Viklund, 1999), but this trend is less clear at the time of writing (January, 2002).
The government will most likely continue to phase out nuclear power, although a
complete phase-out by 2010 is probably a too ambitious goal, by successively replacing it with
energy based on new, inexpensive and “green” technology. And if the electricity prices will
continue to be on quite low levels, there is a hope that other incentives than purely economic
ones will lead to increased levels of savings.
Thus, there appears to be a need for psychological research in the area. It is perhaps
possible to find non-economic factors, which explain some of the variation in people’s electricity
consumption. It is important to note that when the term “electricity saving” is used, it does not
necessarily refer to actual savings of money (even if electricity saving often leads to such
savings). The broader term “energy conservation” is, however, not used instead of electricity
savings, simply because it is too broad; the present study is based on empirical data on electricity
saving. A review of research (see below) on the area suggests that there is room for important
psychological explanatory factors.
Earlier Research and Objectives of the Study
In the present article, a representative sample of the Swedish population is investigated,
with respect to perceptions of risks in general, and nuclear risks in particular, attitudes towards
different aspects of the energy policy issue and towards electricity saving, as well as self-
reported electricity saving behavior. The emphasis when it comes to electricity saving is to find
psychological explanations of attitudes and behavior.                                                                                                                   
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The specific questions in the article are:
1.  How do Swedes perceive different kinds of risks, including nuclear risks, and what risks are
perceived as biggest?
2.  What attitudes do Swedes hold in different energy policy related issues?
3.  Does people’s risk perception influence their attitudes related to energy policy and electricity
saving?
4.  What is the relation between attitudes towards electricity saving and self-reported electricity
saving behavior?
5.  To what extent can psychological variables explain people’s attitude towards electricity
saving?
6.  To what extent can psychological variables explain people’s self-reported electricity saving
behavior?
Earlier research in the area suggests that psychological factors may be of importance
when trying to explain pro-environmental behavior. Cameron, Brown and Chapman (1998) tried
to estimate the influence of social value orientations on actual pro-environmental behavior. It
was found that pro-social participants (i.e., a person who made more cooperative/altruistic
choices in a series of decomposed games) in the study were more likely to send letters supporting
a transportation pollution reduction program, compared with pro-self participants (i.e., a person
who made more competitive/individualistic choices), who were more likely to send letters
opposing the program.                                                                                                                   
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Sadalla and Krull (1995) investigated possible psychological barriers to energy
conservation. Their hypothesis was that conservation measures could negatively affect (as
perceived by the individuals themselves) a person, by stigmatizing the individual and reducing
his or her status. This hypothesis received some support in data and it was concluded that, since
consumption seems to be equated with status, it might be easier to promote the consumption of
products that conserve energy than to discourage energy consuming behavior.
De Young (1996) focused on how people can be intrinsically satisfied, by adapting pro-
environmental consumption behavior. The recommendation based on the results from the study
was that, in order to frame consumption behavior, these intangible, intrinsic, but positive payoffs
should be highlighted.
Axelrod and Lehman (1993) investigated possible predictors of environmentally
concerned behavior and noted that although many people according to research results are
concerned about the environment, this concern does not correlate with action. Three theoretical
concepts were in focus as possible explanations – attitudes towards behavior, personal efficacy in
relation with behavior, and motivational forces behind behavior. Six factors were included in the
final multivariate model, which accounted for 49% of the variance in environmentally concerned
behavior. These were principled outcome desires (the extent to which respondents act in
accordance with deeply held values for the environment), issue importance (absolute importance
of the environment to the individual as well as its relative importance with other social concerns
such as AIDS and poverty), self-efficacy (respondents’ beliefs that they, personally, have the
capability to engage in actions that can help solve environmental problems), social outcome
desires (the extent to which family, friends, and the community served as guides to one’s
behavior with respect to the environment), channel efficacy (perceived difficulty the individual                                                                                                                   
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expected to encounter, when attempting to act in environmentally-protective ways), and threat
perception (perceived likelihood, severity, and immediacy of environmental problems).
In a similar study, structural equation modeling was used to investigate the multivariate
relationship between environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behavior (Grob, 1995). A
model with the following five components was tested, confirmed and found to account for 39%
of the variance in behavior: (a) factual knowledge about the environment and recognition of
environmental problems (the only variable that did not correlate significantly with behavior); (b)
the emotional value which the individual places on aspects of the environment and the
disturbance resulting from his/her perception of the discrepancy between ideal and actual
environmental conditions; (c) openness: post-materialistic beliefs and readiness to adopt new
attitudes (the factor that correlated the most strongly with behavior: 0.45); (d) perceived control:
beliefs about the efficacy of science and technology and beliefs about self-efficacy; and (e) direct
actions that impact the environment.
When it comes to electricity saving, Cialdini (1993) referred to a study in which a chance
for people conserving energy to have their names in newspaper articles, where they were
described as public-spirited and fuel-conserving citizens, motivated them to substantial
conservation efforts within a short period of time (a month). A sense of commitment thus seems
to have an impact on people’s energy-saving behavior. One issue of interest is whether the
effects obtained would persist. It is possible that the effects could have been the result of
“energy-conscious” behavior for a relatively few days that then faded as the utility month
progressed. However, when this possibility was further investigated, it was shown that public
commitment resulted in lower energy consumption throughout a 12-month period (Pallak, Cook
& Sullivan, 1980).                                                                                                                   
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Bernström et al. (1997) investigated the issue of electricity saving, using many of the
variables included in the present study, although their results were not based on a strictly random
sample of the Swedish population. They presented a regression model that explained 27.0% of
the variance in the households’ electricity saving behavior. Four variables were included in this
model: (a) electricity payments; (b) perceived personal risks due to saving electricity; (c) general
hazards as reasons to save electricity; and (d) development of the electricity consumption (during
the last 5 years). It could also be noted that although the households were positive towards
electricity saving, this attitude did not directly affect their saving behavior.
According to the study performed by Bernström et al. (1997), risk perception could be
important in understanding electricity saving. Risk perception research has dealt with how
people tend to perceive the risks in their environment, which means that some of the work has
also focused on risks stemming from different energy sources. It has in many studies been shown
that the attitude towards different energy production systems to quite a large extent is due to the
risks associated with these systems (see for example Bernström et al., 1997; Sjöberg, 1999).
Perceived risks are more important in explaining the attitude than the perceived benefits with the
systems. A rather impressive result is that perceived risks and benefits associated with nuclear
power in general accounted for approximately 60% of the variance in attitude towards nuclear
power (Bernström et al.; Sjöberg & Drottz-Sjöberg, 1993).
Nuclear power is a particularly interesting area in risk perception research. The public
tends to worry more about nuclear risks in comparison with other risks (Drottz-Sjöberg &
Sjöberg, 1990; Drottz-Sjöberg et al., 1994). It is worth mentioning that there exists a notable
difference between the public and experts when it comes to perceived risks associated with
nuclear power. The public perceives nuclear risks as much greater than the experts do (Sjöberg &                                                                                                                   
13
Drottz-Sjöberg, 1994). This distinction between experts and the public is obviously an important
aspect in decisions about energy policy, which ideally include opinions from both parties.
Summing up, the purpose of the present study is to map environmental attitudes, attitudes
towards different energy systems, and risk perceptions of a large representative sample of the
Swedish population. By doing so, the aim is to clarify psychological mechanisms of importance
for some of the energy policy options Swedish decision-makers currently are facing and to
describe the degree of popular support these options may receive. Psychological mechanisms
underlying attitudes to electricity saving and self-reported behavior are especially in focus. One
of the cornerstones of the long-term energy policy decision (that includes the decision to phase
out nuclear power) in Sweden is to enable a transformation to a more economically efficient
energy system, which is also friendlier to the environment, by means of increased levels of
electricity saving in households as well as in industry.
Method
A mail survey was used as means of collecting data. The questionnaire was intended to
cover a wide range of issues and the respondents were therefore asked to answer 313 questions
on a total of 37 pages. The questionnaire was sent out in May 1998. The net sample consisted of
1202 and since 797 questionnaires were completed and returned, the response rate was 66.3%.
One objective of the study was to work with a sample representative of the Swedish
population, in order to be able to generalize the results. According to the sample results
regarding background variables, this objective seems to have been reached. The respondents
were representative of the Swedish population in terms of gender distribution and average age.
With regard to income and education, there was a difference between the respondents and the                                                                                                                   
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Swedish population (on average, respondents had higher income and were better educated than
the population at large). Income is not, however, an important explanatory variable and level of
education tends to be only weakly related to risk perception data. Level of education turned out,
furthermore, to be only moderately related to attitude towards electricity saving (Pearson’s r =
0.19) and not at all related to reported electricity saving behavior. The structure of employment
status among the respondents was quite similar to that of the population, but there were
differences since there were fewer students and more retired people in the sample. This is a well-
known phenomenon, which is probably due to the fact that retired people have more time to fill
out extensive questionnaires. Moreover, there was a notable difference between the share of
unemployed people in the sample and the share in the population, which is probably at least
partly a consequence of the fact that unemployment rates had decreased somewhat in Sweden
from 1997 (population data on unemployment are dated to this year) to 1998. The respondents
were also representative of the population in terms of employer and occupational status. To
conclude, the main conclusion is that the sample on the whole is representative of the population,
especially with a response rate as high as 66.3%.
Electricity saving behavior was measured as an index; a mean was computed on the basis
of reported frequency of different electricity saving activities. The general attitude towards
electricity saving was based on one question. Risk perception was measured by ratings of general
and personal risk of 37 hazards, on 8 step category scales. A “don’t know” response category
was also used and these responses were throughout treated as missing. Attitudes towards eight
energy production systems, as well as perceived risks and benefits associated with these systems,
were measured by 5 step Likert scales. Perceived risks were also measured by asking questions
about the magnitude of risks associated with saving and not saving electricity, respectively.                                                                                                                   
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There was a particular focus on nuclear power, based on its importance for the Swedish
energy production system today and the interesting questions arising from the planned phase-out.
Examples of such questions, which were included in the questionnaire, relate to if it is at all
possible to phase out nuclear power and what the likely environmental, economic, and social
consequences of a phase-out are.
Finally, some questions of a more practical nature were also included. These were mostly
related to the respondents’ living arrangements (e.g., place of living, type of living, size of
apartment or house, and possible ownership of different kinds of electrical appliances).
Results
As noted before, the current trend in people’s attitude towards nuclear power in Sweden
seems to be that they are becoming more positive and more open to a continued use of nuclear
power as a source of energy in Sweden, even after 2010. However, when comparing the attitude
towards nuclear power with the attitude towards other energy production systems, it is evident
that Swedes were still relatively negative towards nuclear power. According to Table 1, it
appears that perceived risk was more important in explaining attitude, compared with perceived
benefits. Nuclear power, to which people were relatively negative, was considered quite risky,
but also as yielding many benefits.                                                                                                                   
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Table 1
Means of Attitude, Perceived Risk and Benefit of Energy Production Systems
Energy  Attitude Personal General  Personal General
source  risk risk benefit  benefit
Solar 1.49 (0.76) 4.69 (0.68) 4.68 (0.67) 2.85 (1.48) 2.81 (1.43)
Wind 1.62 (0.89) 4.73 (0.65) 4.69 (0.66) 2.93 (1.50) 2.79 (1.43)
Hydro 1.84 (0.90) 4.53 (0.75) 4.38 (0.81) 2.17 (1.17) 1.81 (0.96)
Biomass 2.28 (1.01) 3.61 (1.00) 3.53 (0.99) 2.86 (1.25) 2.76 (1.16)
Natural gas 2.44 (0.99) 3.54 (0.95) 3.46 (0.93) 2.49 (1.29) 2.95 (1.07)
Nuclear 3.04 (1.41) 2.79 (1.37) 2.65 (1.34) 3.27 (1.14) 1.98 (1.16)
power
Oil 3.61 (0.97) 2.54 (1.00) 2.42 (0.97) 3.09 (1.19) 2.64 (1.13)
Coal 4.17 (0.93) 2.13 (1.05) 1.97 (0.93) 4.06 (1.08) 3.73 (1.10)
Note. With regard to the attitudes, the respondents were asked to mark their opinion by selecting a number on a
scale from 1 to 5. The steps on that scale were (1) strongly positive, (2) quite positive, (3) doubtful, (4) quite
negative and (5) strongly negative. The risk and benefit scales also ranged from 1 to 5, where 1 = very large
risks/benefits and 5 = very small risks/benefits. Standard deviations are presented within parentheses.
The pattern that perceived risk is more important than benefits in explaining attitudes is
established in Table 2, where ratings of attitude to the eight energy production systems are
regressed on judgments of risk and benefit of these systems. Moreover, it is interesting to note
that the highest amount of attitude accounted for was in the case of nuclear power.                                                                                                                   
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Table 2
Multiple Regression Analysis between Risks and Benefits associated with different Methods of
Producing Electricity and the Attitude towards each method
Energy β, personal β, general β, personal β, general R
2
source risk risk benefit benefit adjusted
Coal -0.09* -0.42*** 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.43
Hydro -0.20*** -0.14** 0.29*** 0.19*** 0.38
power
Oil -0.27*** -0.30*** 0.18*** 0.10* 0.41
Nuclear -0.42*** -0.18** 0.24*** 0.07* 0.59
power
Natural gas -0.13* -0.36*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.38
Bio-mass -0.32*** -0.20*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.44
Solar -0.07 -0.25*** 0.17*** 0.13* 0.17
Wind -0.11* -0.23*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.22
* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.005. *** p < 0.0005.
One explanation of the fact that people perceive more general benefits with nuclear
power compared with most other energy sources is most likely that other energy sources, such as
solar power and wind power, currently are used to a small extent. When asked about their
preferences for the method of producing energy in the future, however, respondents wanted to
see more of solar power and wind power. On a scale from 1 (definitely negative towards using
that source in the future) to 5 (definitely positive towards using that source in the future), the
means for solar and wind power were 4.41 and 4.38, respectively. This could be compared to the                                                                                                                   
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current major energy sources in Sweden, hydro power and nuclear power, where the means were
3.97 and 2.83, respectively. The lowest scores were assigned to oil (M = 2.30) and coal (M =
1.61).
The main conclusion as to the future use of nuclear power as an energy source in Sweden
is that, despite the trend towards more acceptance of nuclear power, there is a fairly strong will
among the Swedes; that will is to use environmentally friendly energy sources such as solar
power and wind power. It is important to note that nuclear power is quite a clean energy source,
when it comes to emissions, but the popular skepticism is more due to perceived (mostly
personal) risks associated with using nuclear power to produce energy.
On the attitudinal level, there also seems to be a widespread support for the governmental
policy of trying to phase out nuclear power, and at the same time increase electricity savings.
One question to the respondents were: “If a phase-out would mean a need to increase the
electricity savings, are you ready to save electricity?”. The scale ranged from 1 to 5 and the mean
was 4.01. See Table 3 for frequencies.                                                                                                                   
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Table 3
Whether the Respondents would Save Electricity if it was needed as a Consequence of a Phase-
Out of Nuclear Power
Statement Frequency in percent
No, definitely not 3.3
No, probably not 8.6
Maybe, maybe not 14.3
Yes, maybe 31.6
Yes, definitely 42.1
The respondents were, however, not as sure about the possibility to replace nuclear
power. When this question was based on the same type of scale as in Table 3 above, the mean
was 3.46. One important point for policy-makers who want to pursue the policy of phasing out
nuclear power, and to increase electricity savings, is to make sure that the citizens are aware of
the connection between these two factors. The respondents were asked about their beliefs about
possible consequences of a phase-out of nuclear power and it turned out that the most likely
consequence was a factor termed “Increased needs for savings” (which included the following
variables: “Increased electricity prices”, “Increased need to save electricity in the households”,
“Increased need to save electricity in the industry”, and “Increased effluent of carbon dioxide”).
On a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely), the mean for this factor was 5.64, which
could be compared with the three other factors: “Reduction of environmental hazards” (M =                                                                                                                   
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4.80), “Reduced standard of living” (M = 4.54), and “An alternative source of electricity” (M =
5.23).
Respondents’ risk perception was investigated by asking them to rate how big they
perceived different risks to be, in terms of risky to themselves as well as risky to Swedish people
in general. The scale ranged from 0 (non-existent risk) to 7 (very large risk) and the mean
personal risk for almost all risks was less than 4 (except for East European nuclear power, with
an average personal risk of 4.73). There was a strong tendency to rate general risks as higher
than personal risks; this was particularly the case with so-called lifestyle risks, such as alcohol
consumption and AIDS. The type of risks where personal risks were considered as big as general
risks were risks associated with nuclear power (this category also included items such as
“nuclear arms” and “nuclear waste”). People perceived these risks higher to themselves, when
compared to non-nuclear radiation risks (e.g., irradiated food and natural background radiation)
and other risks (e.g., floods and air pollution).
Does risk perception affect attitudes towards electricity saving and electricity saving
behavior? This question was tested by using three types of risk perception items: (1) risks
associated with different energy production systems, (2) factors of nuclear risks, non-nuclear
radiation risks, and other risks, as constructed on the basis of the extensive list of separate risk
items, and (3) perceived risks with saving and not saving electricity. In Table 4, correlations
between perceived risks and attitude towards electricity saving as well as electricity saving
behavior are presented.                                                                                                                   
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Table 4
Risk Perception versus Attitudes towards Electricity Saving and Electricity Saving Behavior
(Pearson’s r)
Risks Attitude Behavior
Personal risks with nuclear power 0.12** -0.11**
General risks with nuclear power 0.13*** -0.11**
Personal risks with solar power -0.19*** 0.14***
General risks with solar power -0.20*** 0.08*
Personal risks with wind power -0.16*** 0.07
General risks with wind power -0.20*** 0.07
Personal nuclear risks  -0.11** 0.16***
General nuclear risks  -0.12** 0.17***
Personal non-nuclear radiation risks -0.06 0.12**
General non-nuclear radiation risks -0.07* 0.13**
Personal other risks -0.04 0.13**
General other risks -0.05 0.15***
Personal risks with saving electricity 0.40*** -0.16***
Risks to society with saving electricity 0.34*** -0.14***
Personal risks with not saving electricity -0.19*** 0.08*
General risks with not saving electricity -0.31*** 0.10*
* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.005. *** p < 0.0005.                                                                                                                   
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There was no common pattern as to any possible difference between effects of personal
and general risks. The main conclusion based on the results reported in Table 4 is that perceived
risks generally have weak effects on attitude towards electricity saving and electricity saving
behavior. However, when looking at specific perceived risks, directly related to the issue of
electricity saving, these had an important bearing on attitude towards electricity saving. Since
perceived risk was important also in explaining attitude towards different energy production
systems, it seems that risk is an important aspect of attitudes related to energy policy issues. One
might suggest that a risk associated with saving electricity is a fear of decreased standard of
living and/or level of comfort (due to changed habits), and that a risk with not saving electricity
could be that there would eventually be a shortage of electricity.
As noticed above, it seems to be possible to pursue a policy of replacing nuclear power
and at the same time increase electricity savings, based on the attitudes reported by the
respondents. Overall, the respondents could be considered as very pro-environmental and pro-
electricity saving. For example, it was found that 94.7% of the respondents reported that they, at
least to some degree, “act to maintain and protect the environment”. When asked about their
general attitude towards electricity saving, almost 60% considered it an extremely good or very
good thing. When also including those who answered “rather good”, the figure increased to
approximately 90% of the respondents.
However, the step from having an attitude to actually take some pro-environmental action
can be difficult to take. When using general attitude as single predictor of electricity saving
behavior, it turned out to explain only 5.2% of the variance. Although a statistically significant
relationship, it clearly shows that general attitude is very far from being a powerful predictor of
behavior. This was also shown in the multiple regression models for explaining attitude and                                                                                                                   
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behavior. Four variables (personal risks with saving electricity; general risks with not saving
electricity; perception of whether Sweden can save electricity; interest in environmental issues)
that explained 32% of the variance in general attitude towards electricity saving only accounted
for 8.8% of the variance in self-reported behavior.
The variables affecting behavior were mostly of a different sort than those affecting
general attitude. One interesting exception was a factor called “altruistic reasons for saving
electricity”, which correlated on an approximate level of 0.30 with both attitude and behavior.
This factor included the following reasons for saving electricity: (a) out of concern for the
environment; (b) out of concern for future generations; (c) out of concern for health factors; and
(d) out of concern for Swedish society. Otherwise, the predictors of self-reported electricity
saving behavior clearly reflected that electricity saving to a large extent is dependent on practical
circumstances (see Table 5). The amount of variance accounted for (approximately 20%) is most
likely a reflection of the fact that economic factors (saving money) are at least as important as
psychological ones. It should be noted, though, that 20% explained variance is still a rather
strong result in a social science context.                                                                                                                   
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Table 5
Multiple Regression Analysis of Variables Affecting Electricity Saving Behavior in Sweden
Parameters Electricity saving behavior (β)
Whether received information  -0.13***
about electricity saving
Whether try to act in order to  -0.22***
maintain and protect the environment
Perceived amount of electricity consumed  -0.15***
in comparison with other households
Pleasant temperature at home -0.15***
“Nature people” -0.16***
R2 adjusted 0.198
*** p < 0.0005.
“Nature people” is one so-called lifestyle factor that could be identified on the basis of a
factor analysis. In the questionnaire, a large number of lifestyle items were included, in order to
enable a test of whether “lifestyle” was important in explaining attitudes towards electricity
saving and electricity saving behavior. On the whole, these factors (e.g., “yuppie/consumption
oriented” and “family oriented”) were not very important since they together accounted for
approximately 10% of the variance in attitude and behavior, respectively. However, one of the
extracted lifestyle factors was important enough to be included in the regression model above. It
should be noted, though, that the “nature people” factor is not very reliable (Cronbach’s alpha:
0.52) and only included three items (“It is important to me to be out, in the natural environment”,                                                                                                                   
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“Nature gives me peace of mind” and “I fish, hunt and/or pick berries to get more money to our
household”).
Finally, it is important to mention some limits to electricity saving. That is, although
people may be positive towards electricity saving, there are practical limits to their possibilities
to change their levels of electricity consumption. The most obvious limitations are physical: type
and size of dwelling. If the area of the home of the respondent was large, the respondent was
more likely to be active in electricity saving (R
2
adj = 0.031, F = 26.62, β = 0.180, p < 0.0005).
There is also a limit on electricity saving when it comes to equipment; if the respondent had a
thermostat at home, he or she was more likely to be active in electricity saving (R
2
 adj
 = 0.032, F
= 26.93, β = -0.181, p < 0.0005). Moreover, if the respondent preferred a low temperature at
home, he or she was more likely to be more active in electricity saving (R
2
 adj = 0.042, F = 36.22,
β = -0.209, p < 0.0005). Where the respondent lived was also important for his or her stated
electricity saving behavior – the respondent living in a small community was more likely to be
active in electricity saving (R
2
 adj = 0.014, F = 12.64, β = -0.125, p < 0.0005). Another type of
physical limitation is whether the relation between the respondent and his or her home is
characterized by owner or tenant status. Whether a respondent lives in a private house or in a
rental apartment should be reflected in his or her electricity saving behavior. A person living in a
small apartment does not have the same possibility to save electricity, because of the limited
space as well as the fact that he or she usually does not pay for heating on a basis of level of
consumption, but a flat rate independent of how much is consumed. This was the case when we
tested the assumption on the data. A person living in a private house was more likely to be active
in saving electricity (R
2
 adj = 0.041, F = 35.04, β = -0.205, p < 0.0005), while a person living in a
rented apartment was less likely to be active (R
2
 adj = 0.036, F = 31.03, β = 0.194, p < 0.0005).                                                                                                                   
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Discussion
One of the main results of the present study, with possible implications for policy, was
that respondents wanted to replace nuclear power, mostly because of the risks they perceived
associated with producing electricity based on this energy source. They were willing to pay more
for electricity perceived as environmentally friendlier, and they appeared to understand the
relationship between nuclear power phase-out and levels of electricity consumption. In general,
perceived risks were potent predictors of various attitudes, in particular attitudes towards nuclear
power. Specific risks related to electricity saving were, furthermore, successful in explaining
attitudes towards electricity saving.
Perceived risk was, however, not at all as successful in explaining electricity saving
behavior. Indeed, it was a main finding that behavior was more difficult to explain with
psychological variables, partly because it was to a larger extent a function of practical
circumstances (e.g., type of living). Electricity saving behavior is most likely also influenced by
electricity prices. Earlier research has shown that energy prices have a great influence on
Swedish households’ energy demands (Andersson, 1994). The link between attitudes towards
electricity saving and electricity saving behavior was weak. It seems as if people are
environmentally concerned and positive to electricity saving, but these factors are weakly related
to (self-reported) behavior.
It is thus interesting to divide the two main problems of energy policy into two
categories. One category involves the study of attitudes, which has been shown to be important
for policy, whereas the other category is more related to individuals’ behavior.                                                                                                                   
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Based on the fact that perceived risk appeared to be an important factor in forming
Swedes’ attitudes related to energy policy, it could be useful to conceive of energy policy as a
case of risk policy, focusing on risks associated with nuclear power. Policy-makers base their
decisions on risk judgments to a large extent provided by experts, but for various reasons (e.g.,
political legitimacy) it is also important to consider attitudes and risk perceptions of citizens. A
main dilemma that has been noticed in risk perception research is that experts appear to have
different risk perceptions and attitudes compared to the public. It has been found that experts’
risk judgments have structural properties similar to those of the lay public, while they judge the
level of risk differently as long as it is a risk in their own field of responsibility (Sjöberg, in
press). This seems to be particularly true in the case of risks associated with nuclear power.
Experts perceive nuclear risks as considerably smaller than the public does. A relevant question
is, then, what causes people to perceive risks as high or low? Since the structural properties of
experts’ and the lay public’s risk perceptions appear to be similar, the claim that experts give an
objective and correct assessment of risk, while the public’s risk perception is fraught with many
biasing factors, does not seem credible.
One common hypothesis is that trust in risk management or experts is an important
determinant of perceived risk; that is, the more trust people put in corporations, politicians, and
experts, the lower they perceive risks. Perhaps is trust the answer to the mentioned risk policy
problem? Would higher levels of public trust allow policy-makers to pursue a rational risk policy
(that is, taking advantage of expert knowledge, while at the same time receiving the degree of
popular support necessary for technological progress)? Some commentators argue that trust is the
solution to many risk policy problems, pointing to the notion that so-called siting processes (of
hazardous waste material) often seem to fail as a consequence of people’s distrust in risk                                                                                                                   
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management. Current research suggests that such an explanation might be inadequate in some
important respects. First, in an extensive, yet unpublished, empirical study, Viklund (2002, in
preparation) found that trust was a significant, but rather moderate, predictor of perceived risk,
within as well as across four West European countries. Sjöberg (2001) showed that an important
explanation to the relatively modest explanation value of trust could be people’s perceptions of
knowledge and science. People may trust experts to be competent and honest, but still perceive
risks as high, because they may think that there are limits to science, and, therefore, to experts’
knowledge. Furthermore, distrust and low trust are not necessarily the same thing. Luhmann
(1988) argued that people trust in order to reduce social complexity. If they choose not to trust,
they still have to face complexity and uncertainty, forcing them to pursue different strategies in
order to deal with that complexity. Instead of forming positive expectations, people are forced to
form negative expectations; that is, they distrust instead of trust. These negative strategies give
distrust an emotionally tense and often frantic character, which distinguishes it from trust. Thus,
while the highly negative state of distrust might be important in explaining why people react
with fierce negativity to risky projects, such as the siting of repositories of hazardous waste in
their communities, this does not necessarily mean that low levels of trust will be the major
predictor of high levels of perceived risk. Even though it may be beneficial for policy-makers to
be perceived as trustworthy by the public, it should hardly be the (only) guiding principle for
them in their management of risk policy problems. So far, the most powerful predictors of
perceived risk have been found in proximal variables (e.g., perceived risk of nuclear waste is
well explained by attitude towards nuclear power).
As to the other main subject of the present study, people’s electricity saving behavior, it
was found that the general attitude towards electricity saving was weakly related to levels of                                                                                                                   
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electricity saving. One argument, based on the results, could be based on a questioning of
whether there is much room for psychological factors in explaining electricity saving behavior. Is
it possible at all to induce people to increase their electricity savings without monetary
incentives? Are people living in small apartments (thus with obvious limits to substantial
savings) open to information campaigns about the need to conserve energy, if they perceive few
possibilities to do so, and if the possible decrease in levels of comfort is not obviously matched
by the amount of money to be saved? And, if there are ways to affect people’s electricity saving
behavior on a short-term basis, what about long-term habits? Is it possible to educate people to
carry out long-term changes in electricity consumption patterns? Looking at the Swedes,
environmentally concerned and aware, will they actually act in accordance with their pro-
environmental attitudes if electricity prices will stay on low levels or decrease even further?
Based on research conducted previous to the present study, there seems to be room for
behavioral changes, based on knowledge of the mechanisms underlying people’s consumption
patterns. In the present study, it was found that some environmental attitudes were indeed
relatively important in explaining behavior. If knowledge of strong pro-environmental attitudes
could be combined with knowledge of other important factors, perhaps information and
education campaigns could have long-term effects. One possibility would be to induce people’s
perception of themselves with respect to ethics. In the present study, it was found that an
altruistic factor was an interesting predictor of attitude towards electricity saving as well as
electricity saving behavior. Cialdini (1993) referred to the fact that the description of people as
being environmentally concerned and public-spirited seemed to make them feel more responsible
for their energy conservation behavior. Thus, since being pro-environmental in modern society is
most likely considered as morally “good”, campaigns aiming to combine the environmental and                                                                                                                   
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moral aspects could be successful. A contemporary example of an energy conservation campaign
that seems to have been successful (at least on a short-term basis, where success is simply
operationalized as lower levels of electricity consumption) can be taken from California.
The California energy crisis involved an almost disastrous shortage of energy in 2001.
The immediate cause of the crisis was a dramatic increase in electricity prices on the wholesale
market in 2000 (Sioshansi, 2002). The utility companies paid the wholesalers far more for
electricity than what is normally the case, while they were forbidden by law from passing along
the high costs of electricity to their retail customers. Eventually, this had the consequence that
utility companies were unable to provide consumers with sufficient amounts of electricity (and
gas, since natural gas prices also spiked during this period), due to the unbearable costs of buying
electricity from wholesalers. An interesting aspect is that California officials in 2002 filed a suit
against the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, seeking renegotiations of electricity
contracts signed during the state’s power crisis. The suit was based on the argument that
wholesalers were involved in manipulations of California’s electricity markets. The well-known
economist Paul Krugman (2002) argued that the situation shows that the energy crisis was not
mainly based on a flawed deregulation of the electricity market, as most commentators insist, but
rather, “the flaw was in trusting markets too much, not too little”. In early 2002, California
policy-makers faced two urgent questions (Sioshani, 2002):
1.  How to make it through the summer with demand expected to exceed available capacity for
many hours.
2.  How to manage the soaring costs of buying power from the independent generators, who
were to gain from continued supply shortages.                                                                                                                   
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Since the former question primarily is driven by conservation measures (and also summer
temperatures; in California, high temperatures means higher need for electricity-consuming
cooling equipment), that is the issue I will discuss henceforth. The demand response programs,
in order to reduce demand of electricity in California, that were undertaken in 2001 basically
consisted of five factors (Goldman, 2002): (a) higher gas and electricity rates; (b) discount
programs directed to consumers who conserved energy; (c) utility companies’ energy efficiency
and demand response programs; (d) voluntary conservation and curtailment at governmental
facilities; and (e) the Flex Your Power media campaign. Thus, in order to reduce electricity
consumption in the state, it was considered necessary not only to inform and educate consumers
on the matter, but also to offer financial incentives. Few analyses have so far been conducted, as
to the effects of different programs. It is, however, very probable that the campaign itself was
only one of many factors influencing the vast reduction in demand and consumption of
electricity that actually took place in California during 2001, thereby eliminating the shortage of
electricity. The media campaign informed about prices on gas and electricity, financial rebates,
so-called black-outs in different areas, and how the consumers could conserve energy in the best
way possible. It is difficult to directly compare the effects on electricity consumption, caused by
the media campaign and economic incentives, respectively. This is because the media campaign
and the economic incentives belong to different categories. Whereas the campaign was a source
of information, prices and rebates were obviously very concrete incentives to conserve energy.
Although the immediate reason to save electricity often could be due to economic incentives,
campaigns are not redundant, since they provide information about how to conserve as much
energy as possible and about opportunities to save money by doing so.                                                                                                                   
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Moreover, it is likely that not only increased prices and financial rebates caused
Californians to conserve energy, but also the information about black-outs; that is, the fact that in
some areas, the electricity was shut off during short periods. People probably understood that if
they did not conserve energy these black-outs could continue and perhaps even occur more
frequently in the future. There is also a possibility that people regardless of economic incentives
and black-outs wanted to conserve energy in order to be “good citizens”. This possibility could,
however, be partially related to the fact that the state was in a crisis situation, which is a short-
term perspective, meaning that the ambition to be a good citizen will not necessarily persist on a
long-term basis. One could further speculate about whether the possible willingness to be a good
citizen, even in the short-term perspective, during the end of 2001 was influenced by the events
of 11 September the same year.
When Californians were surveyed about their reasons for reducing electricity
consumption, a large share of them (64%) stated that high energy prices was a very important
reason. Fear of shortages and blackouts, environmental concerns, and weather conditions were
less important reasons, although still important, since the share of respondents stating these
reasons to be very important were 42%, 33%, and 21%, respectively (Hensler, LeBlanc &
Seiferth, 2002).
Another important aspect in the California energy situation is that the state-funded
(approximately 10 million dollars) Flex Your Power campaign actually provided a relatively
small share of media messages, since so much information about the energy crisis was in the
news. One could suspect that the reason for the media’s large interest in energy conservation was
the fact that there was a crisis situation, giving the energy issues unusually high news value.                                                                                                                   
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Summing up, the heavy decrease in electricity consumption in California was most likely
due to the acute crisis situation, which almost forced people to conserve more energy and also
increased the amount of information in media considerably. The natural question, then, is
whether there has to be a disastrous situation in order to make people conserve energy? Indeed, it
should be noted that this was a situation in which a gradual increase in energy conservation
would not have been enough, but there was an urgent need for much lower levels of electricity
consumption.
Finally, another aspect to reflect upon is the short-term versus long-term aspects. Most
actions undertaken to reduce electricity consumption were low-cost behavioral changes, rather
than investments in expensive equipment (Hensler, LeBlanc & Seiferth, 2002). Low-cost
activities do not automatically have long-term effects on electricity consumption. In order to
achieve such effects, people need to make a habit out of saving electricity – how this is to be
done without long-term economic incentives is still a question that remains largely unanswered.                                                                                                                   
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